Revealing: LBJ Planned Those Bombings Before the Election, P. 3

Mrs. Martin Luther King Tells Our Military Experts What Every Negro Knows

"I am here as a Negro. . . . I know what bombings do for an oppressed people. I have seen oppressed people respond to bombing and violence across the South. I would say to the experts who determine our military strategy—bombings only make an oppressed people more determined."
—Mrs. Martin Luther King, Washington March, Nov. 27

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Law for the Moon, When The Earth Is Still Lawless?

Whatever its remote origins, the White House Conference on International Cooperation was primarily public relations. Its climax was a White House reception, held in two shifts. There the assembled herd of academicians, business men, bankers, lawyers, and social workers were to undergo the Johnsonian laying on of hands, and go home glowing. Care was taken to invite no one who might refuse to come. The conference was calculated to put an aura of idealism, intellectuality and concern for peace around Lyndon Johnson as he prepares for further escalation in our savage efforts to impose our will on a small and distant people at the risk of another world conflagration. The war in Vietnam cast its shadow on every subject touched upon, even the most technical. How, for example, discuss "Finance and Monetary Affairs", one of the thirty panel topics, without reference to what the rising cost of the war is doing to price stability at home and the shaky character of the dollar abroad? The war endangers every effort toward the international cooperation the conference was supposed to foster. But the arrangements, the panels and the ground rules were set up to keep the whole affair antiseptic, lest the breath of reality break through and criticism explode.

Jay Lovestone A Peace Dove-nik?

Room was found on the list of panels for such hot issues as "Meteorology" and "Women", but there was none on Vietnam, as there was none on militarism, though the increasing size and power of the military establishment in almost every country are a major threat to international cooperation. There was a panel on "Labor" moderated (if that could possibly be the term) by Jay Lovestone, the labor movement's one-man CIA, himself no small obstacle to the amity of nations. There was, of course, no panel on how we carry on international cooperation in our own Latin American backyard, still seething over the Dominican intervention, though the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations did on one page of its 24-page report mention our efforts there in "maintaining order to allow the free election of a non-Communist government". Whether this remark was foot-in-mouth or tongue-in-cheek must be left to Congressional investigation. We searched through the reports of the committees on Development of International Law, Peacekeeping Operations and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes without finding any discussion of the Vietnamese war, surely a new record in scholarly myopia. But our diligence was at last rewarded when on page 31 of the report of the Committee on Social Welfare we found this scoop:

Recent reports by expert observers [sic] of the problems of homeless children and disrupted families in South Vietnam reveal that there are an increasing number of homeless children now being cared for in orphanages. Hostilities there are creating the inevitable chaos. . . . Experts believe that many of the separated children are only temporarily homeless and that relatives could care for them if the relatives could be located.

There was no mention of the contribution made by b.....g or n.....m to these child welfare problems. The committee, in its formal conclusions:

1. Endorse the steps now being taken by the U.S. Government in dispatching qualified social welfare personnel as part of the present fact-finding teams there.

2. Recommends that the U.S. Government, together with the South Vietnamese Government establish emergency child and family welfare services utilizing and training Vietnamese personnel, with the objectives of reuniting families insofar as is possible and resorting to the institutionalization of homeless children as little as possible.

If the Social Welfare committee had only had a U.S. Air Force consultant he might have explained how easily, by a stepup in B-52 raids, we could reduce the number of both orphanages and orphans.

(Continued on Page Four)

The Only Real Solution

The people of the earth having agreed
that the advancement of man
in spiritual excellence and physical welfare
is the common good of mankind;
that universal peace is the prerequisite
for the pursuit of that goal;
that justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace,
and peace and justice stand or fall together;
that iniquity and war inseparably spring
from the competitive anarchy of the national states;
that therefore the age of nations must end,
and the era of humanity begin;
the governments of the nations have decided
to order their separate sovereignties
in one government of justice,
to which they surrender their arms;
and to establish, as they do establish,
this Constitution
as the covenant and fundamental law
of the Federal Republic of the World.

—From A World Constitution, published by Center for Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Cal.

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And Now A Greater Effort to Prevent the Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong

The Biggest Peace Demonstration in the History of Washington

The March on Washington last week-end was the greatest peace demonstration the capital has ever seen. It was in our country's best traditions. We believe the President and the Secretary of State deserve credit for issuing statements on the eve of the March upholding freedom of dissent. Those not inclined to give them credit for anything need only stop and consider whether they would prefer to have them whipping up mob spirit against those who oppose the war. The fight for peace is a fight to maintain civilized standards in human relations, and to keep open channels of communication. For us to protest with dignity, and for the government to respond by recognizing the right to protest, was a victory for the moral values we seek to affirm. We cannot promote talks with the enemy by creating an atmosphere in which we cannot even talk to each other. In this sense, the struggle for co-existence begins at home.

The Mangy Handful for the War

Even more effective than the peace demonstration, in influencing the White House, was the character of the counter demonstration. It is true that Mr. Johnson asked pro-war organizations not to demonstrate the same day, thus avoiding the possibility of an ugly clash. But if there was any strong support for the war, Lafayette Square at least would have been packed by a hostile throng. As it was the only demonstrators in favor of the war were the usual platoon of Nazi kooks, a handful of East European anti-Communists and three or four Birchite Republicans. Any thoughtful observer from a White House window should have been deeply disturbed by the contrast between these mangy few hatemongers and the 25,000 to 30,000 sober peace demonstrators.

The meeting at the Washington Monument was memorable. By far the most eloquent was Norman Thomas, who only a few days earlier had celebrated his 81st birthday. "I would rather America saved her soul than her face," he cried, in demanding negotiations. Of the havoc our forces wreak in Vietnam he made an unforgettable comment. "The torch of liberty," Thomas protested, "was not intended to set fire to villages." Ronnie Dugger, editor of the maverick *Texas Observer*, reminded Mr. Johnson of what Stephen F. Austin, that early Texan hero, had to say about the folly of trying to rule by military dictatorship. Edwin T. Dahlberg of the National Council of Churches, warned of the effect when on TV-casts "our children see adults burning rice fields, exploding bridges and subjecting each other to torture," Dr. Benjamin Spock said, "We express our love of country by wanting to get our troops back from Vietnam while they are still alive." Carl Oglesby, president of Students for A Democratic Society, tried to relate the struggle against war to the struggle for a better social order. Prof. Joseph M. Duffy of Notre Dame sought to apply the teachings of Popes John and Paul to the war. Not a single major civil rights leader had the nerve to turn up but Mrs. Martin Luther King filled the gap with a touching address.

No small part of the success of the March was due to that devoted band of young students who have done so much so swiftly to transform the civil rights struggle and to energize the fight for peace. Frank Emspak, chairman of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, felt that the peace movement gained in strength and unity from the convention his group held in Washington during the same week-end. It was, however, disappointing to many, especially from the South, that so much time was wasted in parliamentary maneuver and organizational in-fighting and so little on the concrete tasks of fighting for peace in Vietnam. The week-end should be a springboard for greater effort and bigger demonstrations especially to combat the rising tide of savage proposals for bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. That crime against humanity may be just around the corner.

Peace Movement Threatened

"Sterner measures on the homefront also appear in the offing. Effective censorship of news reporting from Vietnam is now favored by a growing number of officials. And quite certainly, there will be less leniency from now on with the kind of organized demonstrations of dissidence which serve to comfort the enemy, undermine morale and, in themselves, lengthen the casualty lists."

—Crosby Noyes, diplomatic correspondent of the Washington Evening Star, *Nov. 29.*

Ho Chi Minh's Replies to Linus Pauling and SANE Ambiguous on U.S. Withdrawal

We have the full text of Ho Chi Minh's reply to Linus Pauling and seven other Nobel Prize winners and of Ho's message to Dr. Benjamin Spock and Prof. Stuart Hughes of the National Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy. The former was broadcast by Hanoi in its English language service at 1682 GMT Nov. 20 and the latter at 0223 Nov. 26. Neither embodies any change in policy and both merely restate the Four Points of last April 8. Neither bears out the New York Times page one headline Nov. 24, "Hanoi's Insistence on A U.S. Pullout Dims Parley Hope." That AP story from Tokyo, based on a monitoring of the broadcast letter to Dr. Pauling said it "appears to have destroyed hopes for a compromise" by making U.S. withdrawal "a condition for a settlement." The text does not bear this out and the AP itself further down in the story admitted that Ho "did not in so many words say that an American withdrawal was a condition for talks."

The Four Points, as reproduced in Ho's letter to Pauling, are ambiguous. Under any return to the principles of the 1954 agreement, foreign forces would have to be withdrawn from both sides. But the Four Points do not make U.S. withdrawal a condition for talks. The shorter message to Dr. Spock and Prof. Hughes, refers to the Four Points and says that if the U.S. aggression stops "peace will immediately be restored." Does this mean that if we stopped firing, they would too? This is the kind of question preliminary talks could explore. This message refers to U.S. withdrawal in another context. Ho says, "I take this opportunity to warmly hail the American people's struggle for the immediate ending of the U.S. Government's criminal war of aggression in Vietnam, the cessation of the air attacks on the territory of the DRV, the withdrawal of U.S. troops. . . ." He thanks Americans for calling for withdrawal but does not himself demand it as a condition for talks.

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McNamara's Computers Must Be The Viet Cong's Favorite Substitute for Comic Books

He Says We've Stopped Losing the War He Told Us in 1962 We Were Winning!

Peace demonstrations are not the only things which may hearten the Viet Cong. A greater source of encouragement must be the optimistic declarations over the years of America's defense chiefs. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his "A Thousand Days" recalls (p. 549) that McNamara on his first visit to Vietnam early in 1962 said, "Every quantitative measurement we have shows we're winning this war." Now, back in Saigon almost four years later, McNamara tells the press "we have stopped losing the war." McNamara's quantifiers will end up by ranking with Rusk's antenna.

When Elephant Meets Mouse

A certain zany quality characterizes all the computations in this war. "U.S. To Match Rapid Viet Red Buildup" said an 8-column headline across the front page of the *Washington Post* Nov. 30. The picture is of our trying desperately to keep up with a tidal inflow of enemy troops. The New York *Herald-Tribune* story the same day quoted intelligence in Saigon as estimating "there are perhaps seven North Vietnamese regiments—14,000 men— scattered in the central highlands." The number of U.S. troops is approaching 200,000 and is expected next year to reach 300,000. This looks like a frightened elephant matching a belligerent mouse. The North Vietnamese troop infiltration, as our intelligence estimates it, just equals the number of South Korean troops sent in to help us. The *Herald-Tribune* gives the number of U.S., South Vietnamese, South Korean, Australian (1,300) and New Zealand (300) troops as 685,600. Last July the Pentagon figured the total Communist forces in South Vietnam at 165,000. Now the Vietcong strength is given as at least 250,000 (London *Sunday Observer*, Nov. 28). Even if these figures are not padded, our totals are almost 3 times theirs and our own U.S. troops outnumber North Vietnam's regulars more than 10-to-1.

Add our overwhelming superiority in weapons and in the air—the Viet Cong don't even have a few trainer planes—and it's clear that our record is hardly glamorous. The London *Observer's* dispatch quoted above tells some obvious truths not to be found in our press. It says that the rapid buildup of U.S. troops this year, far from disheartening the enemy, as we hoped, "has galvanized the North Vietnamese into massive counteraction." Our highly advertised bombings of North Vietnam and of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos has failed to prevent a rapid counter buildup of enemy forces. The Viet Cong is staging a general offensive all around the country, and inflicting heavy casualties on our and allied forces. The widely ballyhooed B-52 raids "against Viet Cong strongholds, such as those around Bien Hoa," the *Observer* says, "have not been particularly effective." McNamara and his generals have been proven wrong again. Do we cover up their past mistakes with fresh and wider bloodshed? A Japanese journalist back from Hanoi with whom I spoke here in Washington several weeks ago told me, as he told many U.S. officials, the Vietnamese would never surrender.

And those talking of bombing Hanoi and Haiphong may usefully be reminded that the French held both the capital and the port all through their war with Ho Chi Minh and yet lost it in the end.

How Our Generals See Victory in Asia

"By now the Pentagon was developing what would become its standard line in Southeast Asia—unrelenting opposition to limited intervention except on the impossible condition that the President agree in advance to every further step they deemed sequential, including on occasion, nuclear bombing of Hanoi and even Peking. At one National Security Council meeting General Lemnitzer outlined the processes by which each American action would provoke a Chinese counteraction provoking in turn an even more drastic American response. He concluded: 'If we are given the right to use nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory.' The President sat glumly rubbing his upper molar, saying nothing. After a moment someone said, 'Mr. President, perhaps you would have the General explain to us what he means by victory.' Kennedy grunted and dismissed the meeting."

—Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.: A Thousand Days.

LBJ Planned Attacks on North Vietnam While Campaigning As Peace Candidate

"His [President Jonhson's] action that night (Feb. 6)—the order that sent U.S. bombers roaring over a remote North Vietnamese village named Dong Hoi—was far from impulsive. As a matter of fact, he had made the momentous decision to bomb North Vietnam nearly four months earlier. That decision was made, it can now be revealed, in October, 1964, at the height of the Presidential election campaign. . . . But he also had good reasons for delaying the execution of his decision to bomb north of the 17th parallel. First, there was the problem of working with a stable South Vietnamese government. . . . Second, there was the problem of preparing for the bombing raids. . . .

"These were the only reasons for delay the President mentioned when he told me in May, 1965, that he had made the decision to bomb four months before Pleiku. But it is fair to assume there were other considerations: One certainly was the fact that the United States was engaged in an election campaign. . . . The American public, though it had reacted favorably to the one-shot air-raid on North Vietnam following an attack on two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August, was not prepared psychologically, for a deliberate calculated step-up in the war effort. . . . The new policy, when put into effect, involved an obvious awesome risk—that North Vietnam and Red China would respond by sending hundreds of thousands of ground troops into South Vietnam confronting President Johnson with 'another Korea.' This was a risk he and his inner circle of advisers had considered endlessly around the Cabinet table. It was a risk all were not only willing to take, but a necessary risk, they felt, if the United States was to get anything but humiliation and defeat out of its ten year policy of blood, treasure, honor and prestige in Indochina. . . .

"In the last weeks of the campaign he said as little as possible about the Vietnamese war (he did not want to 'overidentify' with it, a candid aide explained to me at the time) but did not hesitate to attack Barry Goldwater, by implication, at least, as an 'impulsive' menace."

—Charles Roberts (Newsweek's White House Correspondent) in his new book: "LBJ's Inner Circle," pps. 20-22.

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Polite Frustration Turns to Rebellion on The Conference Floor

(*Continued from Page One*)

Not A Group of Amateurs

The one committee which broke out of official control was that on Arms Control and Disarmament. To the dismay of the State Department representatives on the panel to discuss it, this report broached fresh initiatives in half a dozen stale deadlocks. The committee was chaired by Jerome Wiesner of MIT, who was Kennedy's assistant for science and technology. It included among its members Harold Stassen, who paid with his political career for the genuineness of his commitment as Eisenhower's assistant on disarmament. Prof. Carl Kaysen of Harvard, who was assistant to McGeorge Bundy; Roswell Gilpatric, former Under Secretary of Defense, and Donald G. Brennan of Hudson Institute were among the other members. This is not a group whose views could be dismissed as amateur. It said the failures of the past could be measured "in the trillion dollars that the world has spent for armaments in 20 years" and it urged a whole series of interrelated measures to "reverse the perilous trend of competition in arms before new rounds of weapons development and deployment are initiated." Its most important proposal was for a 3-year moratorium on deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, a monstrously expensive tack in the arms race which could cost easily $20 billion and upset the precarious balance of mutual deterrence. They would drop "the creation of new nuclear forces" in Europe like MLF or ANF in favor of reaching an agreement with the Soviets on non-proliferation. They would have the U.S. agree to the bilateral talks on matters of mutual concern for which Peking has asked. The Committee recommended a comprehensive test ban, and a treaty to end all production of weapons-grade fissionable material. It proposed that the U.S. and other nuclear powers commit one-half of one percent of their defense spending to UN peacekeeping efforts. The committee recommended nuclear free zones in Latin America, Africa and the Near East and a zone of nuclear and conventional arms limitation under UN inspection in the Bering Straits, including comparable areas in Alaska and Siberia. The State Department representatives reacted like outraged virgins to indecent proposals.

The mood on the floor as the conference moved toward its end in the White House reception changed slowly from polite frustration to open rebellion. At most panels, the panelists talked so long there was little chance for rejoinder from the floor. But the last morning the panel on peacekeeping operations (Vietnam unmentioned) precipitated open and popular revolt. Rabbi Jacob Weinstein of the Central Conference of American Rabbis expressed a widespread feeling when he said he was impressed by the talk about the desalinization of the seas, but he couldn't see its value so long as that "great big wall" cut them off from discussion of the war. The climactic moment came when Arthur Larson, once an Eisenhower aide, rose to say he had changed his mind about the admission of Communist China to the UN. He called for its admission and for negotiations through the United Nations to end the war in Vietnam.

Perhaps the loftiest inanity of the Conference came in the report of the Committee on Space. This was silent on our moves toward militarization of space but urged an "international convention to govern human activity on the moon." How do we get the rule of law on the moon when we can't establish it on earth? *Noon, Dec. 1.*

The Only Shortage Would Be People

"Washington—America's power industry could survive direct H-bomb hits on its 206 largest power plants and have more than enough generating capacity left to meet the post nuclear attack demand. . . . The study based on help from 1500 utility companies and published last year, was put together by the Defense Electric Power Administration (DEPA) of the Department of Interior. Commenting on the Interior Department study, the editor of Science Trends notes that the report takes into account two "vital factors" that do not apply in peacetime. These are: The fact that millions would die in an atomic attack thus lowering the demand for power; and the probability that the remaining population would be huddled in fall-out shelters requiring only a minimum of power."

—Miami Herald, Nov. 18.

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